article analyses the interpretation of the phrase "received by, accrued to or in favour of" in the gross income defi nition of the Income Tax Act, as applied to illegal receipts. During the last few decades, South Africans have been victims of a number of Ponzi-type schemes. In MP Finance, 1 the Supreme Court of Appeal considered whether illegal receipts received by the Krion Ponzi-type scheme should be included in gross income. After considering the relationship between the taxpayer and the fi scus, the court concluded that, as from a specifi ed juncture, the taxpayer received the amount for its own benefi t and it should therefore be included in gross income.
15The court recognised that the contractual relationship between the investor and the scheme (taxpayer) could in fact be void, resulting in the investor having a right to recover the investment from the taxpayer. The court did not consider whether the levying of income tax on amounts received by the operator of the scheme could infringe on the investor's right to property espoused under the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 . It is submitted that the levying of tax does infringe on this right as it reduces the amount that could be recovered from the scheme because the original investment in the scheme is void.
6O n 14 October 2010, in the High Court in Pretoria, one of the largest fraud cases in South African history approached its culmination and finalisation, following an eight-year legal process. Mrs Marietjie Prinsloo of Vanderbijlpark, an industrial town south-west of Johannesburg, and six members of her extended family (facing 218 683 charges, including fraud, theft, racketeering and money laundering) were convicted and sentenced to jail terms.
2 Prinsloo received a 25-year jail sentence, and her family members received sentences ranging from five to 15 years. 3 7A fter the collapse of Prinsloo's Ponzi-type scheme 4 in 2002, and her subsequent arrest in the same year, the criminal case against her had garnered national media coverage. It was a subject of intense speculation and conjecture: how had a middleaged wife and mother, with a standard 8 (grade 10) qualification and no previous criminal record managed in the space of five years -after starting a micro-lending business from her home in 1997 -to build a R1.5 billion illegal Ponzi-type scheme. 5 An estimated R908 million of investors' money had vanished. 6 Most of the approximately 14 000 investors in the scheme were financially ruined, losing their pensions, life savings, retrenchment packages and homes. 7 Local churches and schools in the Vanderbijlpark area started feeding schemes and distributed subsistence packages to the victims. 8 Cases of counselling and treatment for depression increased markedly in the area, 9 , and the suicide of at least one investor has been directly linked to the implosion of the scheme.
10 8Th e legal ramifications of Prinsloo's fraudulent scheme went beyond the criminal case heard in Pretoria, however. Three years before the High Court reached its decision, judgment in a separate and related case was handed down in Bloemfontein. This case was less publicised but dealt with taxation: specifically the taxation of Prinsloo's criminal enterprises. The case heard in Bloemfontein (MP Finance Group
CC [In Liquidation] v:
11 [hereafter MP Finance] ) was, in its own way, highly significant and is a landmark in South African tax case law. For the first time in this country's legal history, a case involving the taxation of illegal income had been heard by the Supreme Court of Appeal. 9F or ease of administration, the liquidators of Prinsloo's various enterprises, both incorporated and unincorporated, had consolidated them into one entity: MP Finance Group CC.
12 It was on this entity that the South African Revenue Service (SARS) raised three separate income tax assessments, for the years 2000 to 2002. The liquidators, representing the approximately 14 000 investors, contested these assessments and took the matter to the Natal Tax Court. 13 When that court did not find in their favour, the case was taken to the Supreme Court of Appeal. The liquidator's persistence is not surprising. It is estimated that the tax assessments, in total, amounted to almost R500 million.
14 If the liquidators lost the case, it effectively meant there was that much less to pay out to the investors -and in fact, it would mean that the investors would receive virtually nothing back.
1 0 Guidance can be found in the previous decisions by not only the South African judiciary but also foreign judiciaries. According to the judges in the United States' Glenshaw Glass 15 case, there are two fundamental principles of income tax: the first being that "the Code" (the Income Tax Act) is the decisive basis of tax law and, secondly, that the term "gross income" is the single most important definition that underpins every single realisation of wealth, irrespective of its source. The Supreme Court of Appeal did not deviate from these principles in MP Finance. The point the Supreme Court of Appeal had to consider was whether the amount had accrued to the taxpayer or whether it had been received for the taxpayer's benefit.
Background to and facts of the case 1P rinsloo's Ponzi-type scheme left a trail of economic and financial devastation in its wake. Three-quarters of the "investors" were over the age of 40 and almost 30% were between the ages of 50 and 97 years, indicating that the pensions and retrenchment packages of many had been lost. 17 In addition, many lost their houses, resulting in their having to live in backyard rooms, garages or makeshift shacks. 18 The collapse of the scheme also had severe implications for the local community, which had to provide financial, emotional and practical support to the victims. A social worker reported that the town would probably take decades to fully recover -possibly only once all the scheme's victims were no longer alive.
19 2Th e investors, however, had not always been faced with financial ruin -at least not in the first few years of the scheme. Gullible participants had been informed that they were investing in a micro-lending business and were being paid out "dividends" and "interest". In reality, they were simply being paid a portion of the contributions from newer investors. As is typical of most Ponzi schemes, 20 early participants received substantial returns. Prinsloo was offering -and paying out -returns of 8% to 10% per month. 21 That amounted to returns often exceeding 100% on an annualised basis -roughly ten times the going rate available from a commercial bank at that time. hile matters went well for the scheme and its investors, Prinsloo became known as "the Angel of Vanderbijlpark" -a reference to the financial "help" she was offering the people of the town. 23 At that time, many of the town's residents were, in fact, living in straitened circumstances and needed financial help. Vanderbijlpark was in the midst of a serious and long-term industrial slump, and it could be argued that the rapid rise of Prinsloo's scheme in the late 1990s was inversely related to the economic fortunes of the town. steelworks was sought and found on grassy farmland along the Vaal River, west of Vereeniging. The site had much in its favour: there was unlimited room for expansion, the gently sloping terrain allowed for sufficient drainage down to the river, relatively high open ground meant that prevailing winds would minimise pollution in the area, and the site was downstream from the purification plant that supplied the Witwatersrand's water needs. 5Th e person responsible for choosing the site was one Hendrik Johannes van der Bijl. A brilliant scholar, educated in Stellenbosch and Germany, Van der Bijl had, by the age of 25, begun a stellar career as a scientist and inventor in the United States. Seven years later, the 32-year-old Van der Bijl -handpicked by the then Prime Minister, General Smuts -returned to his homeland in 1920 in the capacity of technical advisor to the South African Government. Within eight years of returning, Van der Bijl had been appointed first chairman of not only the newly created Electricity Supply Commission (Escom), but also the Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR). It was in his capacity as chairman of ISCOR that Van der Bijl identified and approved the steelwork's site near the Vaal River.
25
6O nce the location for the steelworks had been selected, plans were put in place to develop and establish an independent town alongside it. In 1943, the town of Vanderbijlpark came into being. 26 The town was intended to be "a modern garden city and a modern industrial town in such a way as will most effectively promote all possible amenities, conveniences and benefits for, and the general welfare and wellbeing of, the inhabitants". 27 More than half a million trees were planted in order to transform the town and surrounding area into the "Hyde Park" of South Africa. org.za/dated-event/dr-hendrik-johannes-van-der-bijl-sa-industrialist-who-laid-foundation-establishment-esco (Accessed: 7 August 2013 prices entered a downward trend for a variety of reasons; excess production capacity and rising international competition following the fall of the Soviet Union, were two significant contributing factors. 31 The South African steel industry was not left unaffected. Employment in the sector declined from 54 000 in 1990 to 24 000 in 2000 32 -many of those job losses occurring at the Vanderbijlpark plant, where blast furnaces and strip mills were decommissioned.
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9I t was against this background of large-scale layoffs, unemployment and financial hardship in the late 1990s that Marietjie Prinsloo, from her suburban Vanderbijlpark home, started what was ostensibly a micro-loan lending business, offering naïve and unsophisticated investors -many recently retrenched -huge returns. It is in some ways not surprising that her scheme lured so many victims, given the parlous state in which a significant portion of the town's residents found themselves.
1 0 Ponzi schemes inevitably unravel when the required number of new contributors cannot be found to pay out existing investors. 34 At the beginning of May 2002, payouts to investors had become sporadic. 35 By the end of that month, the pay-outs had stopped. 36 Prinsloo's various entities were placed under provisional liquidation the following month. 37 In July 2002, the police's commercial branch and Serious Economic Offences Unit arrested her and other members of her family. The arrestees spent four nights in a jail cell until being released on bail for a combined amount of R45 000. 38 They were to remain free on bail until the High Court hearing, some eight years later. (17 972 convictions) . 47 Each of these convictions brought separate sentences ranging from six months to 20 years -the vast majority being served concurrently -resulting in an effective jail term for her of 25 years. The sentences in aggregate are astounding, however, amounting to a total period in excess of 29 000 years. 49 The assessments covered a three-year period, from 2000 to 2002, and reportedly amounted to just under R500 million. The quantum of those assessments made it inevitable that the liquidators, representing thousands of investors, would contest them.
13Th e fact that MP Finance Group CC had generated its income illegally was not a matter of dispute. What was disputed was whether that fraudulently derived income could be subject to taxation. 50 The South African Income Tax Act 51 makes no specific reference to illegal income. Hence when the case went to court, both plaintiff and appellant had to rely on a precise interpretation of the Act's wording and the precedent offered by the relatively sparse case law that had, in the past, dealt with this issue. consistent -had developed around this issue. The significance of MP Finance lies in the fact that, decades after the issue had first been raised in our courts, the South African Supreme Court of Appeal was finally called upon to bring some clarity and finality to the question of whether illegal receipts are in fact taxable. 2Th e argument that the illegality of a business precludes the South African state from taxing the profits of that business was first mooted in CIR v Delagoa Bay Cigarette Co Ltd 52 in 1918. Delagoa Bay Cigarette Co Ltd sold packets of cigarettes worth sixpence for ten shillings. Each packet sold included a coupon with a lucky number. An advertisement was placed on each coupon stating that two-thirds of the income received would be distributed as prizes. Winning voucher numbers were advertised and the distributed prizes ranged from £2 000 to £2. After paying two distributions, the company was successfully prosecuted for running an illegal lottery. The court had to decide if the income earned from this illegal transaction could be subject to income tax. 3Re lying on the precedent of English case law, the court found that the legality or illegality of a business was irrelevant to the issue of whether income is subject to taxation. The South African Income Tax Act makes no reference to the taxation of illegal income and, as a result, the starting point for determining whether any amount, legal or illegal, will be subject to tax is the Income Tax Act's "gross income" definition.
53 If a particular receipt -legal or otherwise -does not comply with that definition it cannot, apart from the application of capital gains tax, be subject to income tax. hen it comes to illegal income, there should be no question of "accrual". Accruals involve amounts that have not yet been received -a situation that does not apply to most cases of illegal income, as the income is already in the criminal's possession. "Accrual", furthermore, implies a legal entitlement which a thief can never have. 55 The issue of "receipt", however, has been reported to be the crux of most cases dealing with the taxation of illegal income. The recurring question raised in our courts is: can cash or belongings, illegally obtained, truly be "received" by a felon, in terms of the requirements of the definition of "gross income" in the Income Tax Act; and, if so, can that receipt then be subject to tax? 6At the outset, it is important to be aware that one issue in the "received by" debate has never seriously been contested by either taxpayer or SARS: the word "received", as used in the Income Tax Act, cannot -and was never intended to -be given its widest, everyday meaning. It has been pointed out, for example, that a farmer who borrows a tractor has, in the ordinary sense of the word, "received" it. Likewise, a person who borrows money from a bank has, in normal usage, "received" the money. But this is not the interpretation to be placed on the wording in the Income Tax Act definition. As soon as an object or an amount of money is borrowed, a corresponding obligation arises to return the item or repay the amount. What has been borrowed can never rightfully be said to belong to the borrower, and for the purposes of taxation, has not been "received". "received" should not be given its broadest meaning, the question arises: What should the word mean, for income tax purposes? One interpretation is that "received by" must mean "received by the taxpayer on his own behalf for his own benefit" (emphasis added). 57 In terms of this interpretation, an agent collecting rentals on behalf of a client will not have "received" the income because it is not received on his or her behalf or for his or her own benefit. Physical control over money or items that can be turned into money does not therefore necessarily mean that "receipt" has taken place. 58 The courts' interpretation of "received by" in cases dealing with "receipt" was not, however, within the context of illegal income.
8I n cases prior to MP Finance, where the taxation of illegal income had been disputed, the arguments of taxpayers and SARS had followed various strands. In COT v G, it was argued, on behalf of a taxpayer, that the word "received" should be given its ordinary dictionary definition. 59 The taxpayer was employed by the government and his duties included the management of money for specific projects and tasks. During his period of employment, he managed to steal approximately $58 000 of the funds under his control. After being caught, he was convicted of theft with part of his prison sentence suspended on condition that he repaid the stolen money. (20 SATC 113) e taxpayer succeeded in his argument that the definition of "received" indicates that the acts of giving and receiving are inextricably linked. In other words, in order for there to be a receiver, there must be a giver. When it comes to theft, property is patently never given -it is taken. And if it is not given it has not been "received", and is therefore not taxable. 60 Stein submits that stolen money is analogous to borrowed money. 61 This argument is based on the subjective presumption that stolen money or property can never belong to or become the property of a thief. It, like borrowed money, is only received by the felon in the broadest sense of the term; and the moment possession is taken of the stolen item, an obligation immediately arises to repay or return it. The criminal cannot therefore be said to have "received" the money in the way in which the term is used in the "gross income" definition.
Lategan v CIR, (2 SATC 16). 56 CIR v Genn,
1 0 Not all illegal income, however, arises as a result of outright theft. Illegal schemes often involve willing participants handing over their money. In other words, there is no unilateral taking and, as a result, the line of argument pursued by the taxpayer in COT vs G 62 is not always necessarily valid. A taxpayer 63 who bought and sold stolen diamonds and operated an illegal "milk culture" scheme, in terms of the scheme members of the public acted as "growers". The investor would buy "activators" from the company which were then used to grow the milk cultures ("crops"). After a specific period, the crops would be harvested and the crops would then be sold back to the company. The proceeds could then be withdrawn or used to buy more "activators". 1 1 The taxpayer could not argue that the money had been received from unwilling participants and accordingly had followed a different line of argument.
64 His counsel's contention was that the scheme was, from the outset, void. As a direct result of that invalidity, the taxpayer had no right to the income and the amounts involved could not therefore have been "received by or accrued to or in favour of" him. The court, however, disagreed. It found that all consequences flowing from void contracts could not be ignored. The taxpayer had received the income on his own behalf and for his own benefit. The fact that the scheme had no legal substance did not alter that fact. As far as the court was concerned, there was "no reason for holding that such an amount is not 'received' within the definition of gross income in section 1, if that word is to be given its ordinary literal meaning". e issue of whether an amount has been received on behalf of a taxpayer and for his or her benefit is, however, not necessarily clear-cut. In one case, a stockbroker, acting as an agent, generated secret profits by manipulating various share transactions at his client's expense. 66 The issue before the court was whether those secret profits were taxable in the hands of the stockbroker. The court found that even though the taxpayer's subjective intention was to benefit from those profits, in terms of the law of agency, he had not legally "received" the income in his own right and for his own benefit. As a result, the court found that the secret profits did not fulfil the requirements of the gross income definition and, accordingly, were not taxable in the hands of the stockbroker.
13So me of the legal arguments referred to above -raised over a period spanning some 80 years -were again employed, although with certain nuanced differences, when the MP Finance case went to the Natal Tax Court in 2005 and, two years later, on to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
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Legal precedent created by MP Finance 1Although various cases have considered the principles governing illegal receipts, none of these cases were heard by the Supreme Court of Appeal, 68 which has the ability to create new rulings that are binding on all lower courts. 2Dur ing the lower court judgment, 69 Judge Levinson was of the view that the investor deposits received by MP Finance CC were "receipts" 70 and fell within the ambit of the Income Tax Act 71 -notwithstanding the fact that the Krion Ponzi-type scheme was itself illegal, as were all the investors' transactions in the scheme. On appeal, the applicant argued that the taxpayer was liable in law to refund the deposits she had taken from investors, meaning that the investment amounts or "deposits" fell outside the ambit of "receipts", and consequently, the scope of the definition of "gross income" in the Income Tax Act. 3Acc ording to the court, an illegal contract can have consequences, including fiscal ones. 72 The question whether a valid contract was entered into between the investor and the scheme, is one of fact. If a valid contract was entered into between the parties, obligations will arise. The investor, who is the creditor, is entitled to claim performance from the scheme. Assuming that a valid contract existed, the investor may cancel the contract owing to misrepresentation on the part of the scheme. An investor would similarly have another remedy available -in the form of an undue enrichment claim. 73 It is suggested that a bona fide investor cannot enter into a valid contract when investing in a Ponzi scheme.
4In terestingly, the court stated that although the relationship between investor and scheme was considered in the liquation proceedings, 74 it should not be considered when considering the taxability of an amount 75 -only the relationship between the scheme and fiscus should be taken into account. In a unanimous decision, Judge President Howie 76 found that although the amounts received were immediately repayable in law, they still constituted receipts. 77 The court found that because MP Finance knew that the scheme was insolvent and it would not be able to repay the money it received, its intention was to retain the money for its own use. Consequently, the taxpayer was operating a scheme of profit making, 78 and the amount received was included in gross income.
Constitutional right to property 1The court's decision raises a key issue in relation to the investors' constitutional right to property. The decision of the court may have adversely affected the investors' right to property 79 as espoused in the Bill of Rights, 80 when considering the consequences of illegal contracts between subjects of law. It is suggested that the court's finding results in the right to claim property, lost as a result of an illegal contract, being secondary to the right of the fiscus.
72 Although the judges in these cases did not refer to foreign judgment, section 39 of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of South Africa, 1996 , states that the courts may consider foreign law as applied in foreign judgments. In this case, the court could have followed the judgment by the Canadian court in Johnson v The Queen 2011 TCC 540t. 73 Hutchison, D., Pretorius, C., Du Plessis, J., Hawthorne, L., Kuschke, B., Maxwell, C., Naude, T., and De Stadler, E. 2013.
The Law of Contract in South Africa, 2nd edition. Cape Town: Oxford University Press. 74 Fourie NO and Others v Edeling NO and Others, 2004 ZASCA 28. 75 MP Finance at par 12. lthough an analysis of the provisions of the Income Tax Act indicates that it prima facie infringes on a person's right to property, it falls within the limitations imposed by Section 36 81 of the Constitution. 82 The limitations recognise that the rights included in the Bill of Rights are not infinite but subject to acceptable limitations, for example, levying income tax. 3Th e right to property refers to the rights of a person to use his or her assets (including cash) as he or she pleases. 83 If a person loses his or her property without the intention to transfer ownership, he or she has certain remedies to reclaim that property.
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4W hen a person unknowingly makes an investment in a Ponzi scheme, he or she can institute action to regain ownership of the investment. 85 The transaction should be classified as void, resulting in the investor obtaining an immediate recovery right.
86 The court's decision in MP Finance 87 meant that any recoverable amounts would be reduced by the tax levied. It is submitted that the investor's right to property was therefore infringed upon. It is clear from the provisions of the Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill, 88 that it is the intention of the Bill to confirm and amplify the Constitutional right to property (both corporeal and incorporeal) and to protect investors from arbitrary deprivation, by the State, of their investments. 89 However, the arbitrary deprivation of property was never contemplated by the liquidator in argument to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
5A
lthough the imposition of tax on amounts received by the Krion Ponzi-type scheme limits the investor's right to property and ownership, one has to consider whether the infringement 90 is "reasonable and justified in an open and democratic society". It is suggested that the levying of taxes is reasonable and can be justified in that it provides the fiscus with income to finance government's expenditure. 91 However, as imposing tax on illegal transactions differs materially from the normal principles relating to the raising of taxes and levies, the reasonableness of the tax burden resulting from the decision in MP Finance must be measured against the constitutional obligation of both the fiscus and taxpayers alike to respect each other's fundamental right to property. 6Th e unreasonableness of the tax imposed is further illustrated when considering all the possible tax implications associated with the transaction. Any interest an investor receives on his or her investment will be included in his or her gross income. However, history has taught us that very few investors in Ponzi schemes receive any return on their investments, 92 with the majority losing all or most of the money they invested. Interestingly, if payment is made to an investor at a higher interest rate than what could be obtained from a bank, it is seen as a gift 93 for insolvency purposes. In Rosseau en Andere v Malan en 'n Ander, 94 the court found that these payments can be set aside in terms of the Insolvency Act when the scheme collapses. All interest amounts received by investors from MP Finance were reclaimed from the investors irrespective of whether the amounts were received or were reinvested in the scheme and subsequently lost. 7I t is submitted that the taxing of the amounts received by the scheme result in an unreasonable treatment of the investors in light of the fact that the transaction is void. This can be illustrated by considering the consequences of a solvent scheme, the investor would invest R100 in the scheme. Although the scheme is solvent before the imposition of tax the capital amount available for distribution to the investor will now only be R68 (R100 -28% normal tax [assuming it is a corporate taxpayer]). The effect of this judgment is that the investor lost part of his capital in favour of the fiscus, despite the fact that the transaction was void. Although the investor could in some situations claim the loss as a capital loss, the tax reliefs would be limited to a maximum of R3.72. article makes a contribution to the field of taxation by investigating whether the taxation of illegal receipts infringes on the right of the victims of illegal schemes not to be arbitrarily deprived of the ownership of their property right guaranteed by section 25 of the Constitution. 2Th e article analysed the recent decision by the Supreme Court of Appeal in the case of MP Finance. The main principle the court had to decide on related directly to the taxation of illegal receipts, with specific reference to amounts received by Marietjie Prinsloo in operating the Krion Ponzi-type scheme. The Supreme Court of Appeal held that it was the intention of Marietjie Prinsloo to use the amounts received for her own benefit and the amounts were therefore subject to tax. The court, however, did not rule on the consequential effect or relationship between the investors and the scheme operators, collectively referred to as MP Finance. As legal counsel for the investors never pursued the pivotal issue concerning the right of the investors not to be deprived of their property as espoused under the Constitution, it is still unclear to what conclusion another court would have come in this matter had this argument been raised. What is clear now is that in terms of the Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill, any expropriation of investor property must be subject to just and equitable compensation.
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3M P Finance drew a curious distinction between the relationship between the parties involved in the transaction (the scheme and the investor) and the relationship between the fiscus and the scheme. When considering the relationship between the investor and the scheme, it is clear that the investor had obtained a right against Marietjie Prinsloo and her family (the operators), and had a claim to the amount originally invested. Since the amounts received by the scheme are subject to income tax, a liability is created in favour of the SARS for the taxes due. When the scheme comes to its inevitable end, and is sequestrated, a preferential creditor's claim is created in favour of SARS. 97 This preferential creditor's claim under the Law of Insolvency infringes on the investors' right to property, as the original investment in the scheme is void, resulting in the investor being able to reclaim the investment -now reduced by the amount of income tax payable. 
